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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, the American public has come to recognize
pollutant trading schemes as a potentially valuable way of reducing the level of
pollution in our society at a lower cost than could be offered by conventional means.
t Andrew M. Wolman, Associate, White & Case, New York; J.D. New York University School of Law
2003; B.A. Princeton University 1999. 1 would like to thank Professors Richard Stewart and Katrina
Wyman of the New York University School of Law and Dr. Alon Tal of the Arava Institute of
Environmental Studies for their comments and guidance.
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Most of these schemes up until now have concentrated on air pollutants; so-called
emissions trading. However, in the last few years, we have seen increasing interest
in effluent trading, or the trading in water pollution discharge rights.
According to one definition, effluent trading allows "one entity to remove or
prevent additional pollutant discharges while allowing another to discharge more,
under the control of an agreement between the two parties involved in the trade."'
When properly conducted, a trading program can achieve reductions of a particular
pollutant or class of pollutants at a lower cost than would be feasible under
traditional command and control methods.2 Effluent trading schemes are virtually
certain to proliferate around the world in years to come, yet there has been
remarkably little consensus as to what are the necessary ingredients for developing a
workable trading scheme.
The goal of this paper is to provide a background of what has been learned to
date about effluent trading, primarily garnered from analyzing a handful of the
longest running and best studied projects in the United States and Australia. The
structure of the paper will include an introduction to the history and theory of
effluent trading, followed by an overview of six effluent trading schemes utilized in
the United States and Australia. At the end of this discussion, certain lessons from
these projects will be presented that should be of use when developing new effluent
trading projects.
This paper will be organized in the following manner: Section II will briefly
describe the economic theory behind effluent trading. Section III will then describe
the historical development of such schemes, primarily in the United States. Section
IV will examine in some detail a number of the better established effluent trading
schemes in the United States and Australia. Section V will outline some lessons that
can be learned from the previously described effluent trading schemes. Section VI
will conclude by providing certain recommendations for the development of new
effluent trading systems.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION TRADING
In the United States, as in most other countries, pollution regulation has
traditionally been based on the command-and-control framework. This involves the
imposition of controls and/or emission limits on dischargers in order to meet a
desired standard of air or water quality, or a desired level of technological
sophistication in terms of pollution control. While the command-and-control
framework has produced impressive improvements in environmental quality, from
1. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources website on Watershed Based Pollutant Trading, at
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003). In fact, this
definition can be seen as overly simplistic. There are times when a seller may not actually be removing
or preventing additional pollution, depending on the initial allocation of permits (Russia's role in the
Kyoto regime could turn out to be an example of this). Also, the buyer and seller need not be the actual
polluting parties-brokers, middlemen and investors can often participate in effluent trading markets as
well.
2. National Wildlife Federation, A New Tool For Water Quality: Making Watershed-Based
Trading Work for You, available at http://www.nwf.org/watersheds/pdf documents/newtool.pdf, at 5
(last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
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an economic perspective it has a number of important failings. According to one
analyst, command-and-control regulation,
creates enormous economic waste by failing to equalize the marginal costs
of control of the same pollutant across different sources. Uniform 'one size
fits all' requirements are adopted for categories of industrial facilities,
ignoring large variations in the costs of control among different facilities
within the same category. In addition, the piecemeal and uncoordinated
character of regulation writing results in large differences in the marginal
costs of control among different categories of facilities.'
Economic incentives for environmental improvement such as pollution taxes
and emissions trading were first proposed by economists as alternatives to
command-and-control regulation in the late sixties and early seventies.' The theory
behind tradable permit systems is that given a constraint on the use of a pollutant,
tradable permits will maximize the value received from the emission of that
pollutant. In a perfectly competitive market, tradable permits will flow toward their
highest value use. Those who receive a lower value from the use of the permits have
an incentive to trade them to those who receive a higher value from their use.' This
theory holds true regardless of how the tradable permits are initially allocated.'
Tradable permits also provide continuing incentives for innovation and investment
in less polluting technologies, as sources that succeed in such innovation can profit
from trading their excess pollutant credits, thereby gaining a competitive advantage.7
As with all markets, the theoretical desirability of pollution trading markets is
based on assumptions of a well functioning marketplace. Some economists have
pointed out that in the real world marketable permit systems could experience
domination from a single firm or small handful of firms or could fail to perform well
due to high transaction costs.
8
A. EFFLUENT TRADING
Water pollution programs are attractive candidates for the introduction of
pollutant trading schemes. For a number of reasons, including size, control
technology, and characteristics of the incoming waste stream, effluent dischargers
3. Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: An Environmental Paradigm, 15
J. L. & COM. 585, 587-88 (1996).
4. See T.D. CROCKER, The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in THE
ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION (H. Wolozin, ed., 1966); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES
(1968) (proposing a tradable permit scheme specifically geared towards water pollution); D.
Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
THEORY 395, 395 (1972).
5. See generally W.J. BAUMOL & W.E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(1988).
6. See Montgomery, supra note 4.
7. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 2 1,
99 (2001).
8. Robert Hahn & Gordon Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 621 (1989). While market domination problems have not arisen in existing effluent
trading schemes (and would presumably be covered by the antitrust laws if they did), high transaction
costs have posed a problem to some systems, as will be described in more detail in sections IV and V.
2003]
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can face vastly different costs of compliance.' Therefore, effluent trading should
theoretically lead to considerable cost savings in achieving a particular level of
effluent emissions. According to one commentator, there are five main benefits
associated with water pollution trading. These are: 1) cost savings; 2) incentives to
reduce pollution beyond the current limits; 3) incentives for technological
innovation; 4) an emphasis on water quality rather than the installation of particular
abatement technology, and 5) the possibility of the participation of independent
groups.
10
While effluent trading programs are by now widely accepted by economists
and policy makers as a valuable option to consider when developing pollution
control programs, there is still considerable opposition to the idea from some
environmental groups." This is largely based on the idea that polluters should not
possess a 'right' to pollute.
12
Three of the most important issues that must be dealt with in effluent trading
schemes are hot spots, monitoring, and transaction costs. These issues will be
discussed in greater depth later on, but they merit a brief introduction at the outset.
Hot spots refer to local pockets of intense pollution.'3 They can occur with or
without effluent trading, but there is concern that poorly managed trading systems
can exacerbate this problem. Monitoring refers to the need for regulatory bodies to
monitor discharges in order to promote compliance with a trading system. Effective
monitoring systems are composed of data, data management and verification
components. 4 Transaction costs refer to the costs of actually effectuating trades, and
high transaction costs can be a serious barrier to efficient pollutant markets.
Effluent trading schemes can be conceptually divided into "closed" systems
(also called "cap and trade" systems") and "open" systems. 5 Closed trading systems
contain a mandatory cap on emissions or discharges and individual allowances to
9. Paul Faeth, Fertile Ground: Nutrient Trading's Potential to Cost-Effectively Improve Water
Quality 13 (World Resources Institute 2000), available at http://pdf.wri.org/fertileground.pdf (last
visited Oct. 21, 2003).
10. Sandra Rousseau, Effluent Trading to Improve Water Quality: What Do We Know Today? ETE
Working Paper 2001-26 at 3 (2001), available at
http://www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ew/academic/energmil/downloads/ete-wpO1-26.pdf (last visited Oct.
21, 2003).
11. The Sierra Club Policy on Trading reads in part as follows:"The Sierra Club opposes use of
trading. In all cases, if a program is initiated, there must be full public notice, disclosure, participation,
oversight, accountability, verification, and effective enforcement, with rights of appeal for affected
citizens and administrative and judicial remedies."
http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/trading.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
12. According to Nancy Stoner, director of NRDC's clean water program: "The EPA's pollution
credits trading program is based on the notion that it's okay for some dischargers to pollute at higher-
than-legal levels... Rather than trade away the Clean Water Act by giving industries the right to pollute,
the government should enforce clean water protections." National Resources Defense Council website,
at http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/health water.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
13. Michael Naughton, Establishing Interstate Markets for Emissions Trading of Ozone
Precursors: The Case of the Northeast Ozone Transport Commission and the Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management Emissions Trading Proposals, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 195, 198
(1994).
14. Rousseau, supra note 10, at 7.
15. Faeth, supra note 9, at 13; Kurt Stephenson, Leonard Shabman & Leon Geyer, Toward an
Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance Trading System: Identifying the Statutory and Regulatory
Barriers to Implementation, 5 ENVTL. LAW 775, 783, n. 22 (1999).
[Vol. VIII
EFFLUENT TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
participating sources. The cap is established by the regulatory agency to achieve the
desired environmental quality standards. Under the U.S. Clean Water Act, caps can
be set for individual watersheds through the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)
process. Allocations in the form of allowances are then established for each
discharge site within the trading area. A trading system is said to be "fully closed"
when all discharge sites are controlled under the cap and the cap is equal to the total
permissible load for the watershed. 6
Open trading systems rely on existing regulations to establish an emissions
baseline; reductions from the baseline generate a credit." Depending on the
program, these credits can then be banked, 8 traded, or used to comply with
discharge limits established by reducing discharges at an outside site (i.e., a site that
does not itself have a discharge limit under the program). Open systems offer
greater operational flexibility without the administrative burden of establishing a
mandatory cap and allowances for each discharge site. While open systems tend to
have higher transaction costs for individual trades, they generally involve fewer up-
front administrative costs.
It is important to note that both open and closed trading systems are compatible
with technology-based standards. For reasons of both law and policy, all American
effluent dischargers must use a certain minimal level of pollution control
technology, regardless of whether or not they are also participating in an effluent
trading system. 9
B. POINT SOURCES AND NON-POINT SOURCES
As a practical matter, effluent trading systems are also classified as to whether
they allow trading between point sources, trading between point and non-point
sources, or trading between different non-point sources. There is no completely
satisfactory definition for what constitutes a point source and non-point source, but
one simple distinction is that point sources are pollution sources that can be
attributed to a discrete conveyance, while non-point sources cannot be attributed to a
discrete conveyance.2" In the United States, point sources are subjected to
16. Kurt Stephenson & Leonard Shabman, Effluent Allowance Trading: A New Approach to
Watershed Management, WATER SCIENCE REPORTER (1996).
17. Faeth, supra note 9, at 14.
18. Banking allows a user to store its permits for future use. According to standard economic
theory, a fully value-maximizing tradable permit scheme must have full temporal fungibility, implying
the use of banking. See, e.g., J.D. Rubin, A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and
Borrowing, 31(3) JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 269 (1996); C. Kling
& J.D. Rubin, Bankable Permits for the Control of Environmental Pollution, 64(1) JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 99 (1997).
19. This is Principle 1 of the EPA Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading. See EPA Draft
Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, p. 2-4 (1996), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framwork.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
20. See David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean
Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 515, at 516 (1996). The EPA defines
point source as follows: "A point source is any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate collection system, or vessel or other
floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged." EPA Draft Framework, supra note 19, at
2003]
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mandatory regulation of emissions under the Clean Water Act, while non-point
sources have no mandatory regulations. The one exception to this is concentrated
animal feeding operations ("CAFOs"), which are feedlots containing over 1,000
animals. Runoff and manure from these feedlots are regulated as if it were from a
point source. Important non-point sources of water pollution in the United States
include agriculture, silviculture, urban runoff, construction, food processing,
transportation, and mining, along with medical and recreational facilities.2"
The simplest type of effluent trading scheme only involves trading between
different point sources, or point-point trading. There has been a good deal of
experience with point-point trading of air pollutants, however for a number of
reasons point-point trading has been slow to take hold in the water pollution context.
In point-non-point source trades, point and non-point sources agree on reductions.
Typically, these agreements involve reductions in non-point source pollutant
loadings in lieu of additional point source reductions. Trading between point and
non-point sources is particularly desirable where there is a wide differential in the
costs of controlling water pollution by point and non-point sources. Empirical
studies have shown this to be the case in many parts of the United States. 2
Non-point-non-point trading describes situations where non-point sources that
have a responsibility or a commitment to reduce pollutant loads arrange for
reductions at other non-point source sites. Non-point-non-point trading can occur
when non-point sources meet state or local requirements by "installing best
management practices (BMPs) or conducting restoration at" other locations. 3
Finally, there are two other categories of effluent trading that this article will
not dwell on as they present few conceptual differences from the three previously
mentioned categories: intra-plant trading and pretreatment trading. Intra-plant
trading "allows a single facility that maintains multiple outfalls to allocate pollutant
discharges among them in a cost-effective manner."24 Pretreatment trading refers to
agreements that affect the allocation of pollutant loads among facilities that
discharge wastewater into treatment facilities. 5
2-2.
21. Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Albert J. Thomas III, The Federal/Arkansas Water Pollution Control
Programs: Past, Present & Future, 23 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 541, 562-63 (2001).
22. An independent study of three watersheds in Minnesota, Michigan and Wisconsin found that
the cost of controlling phosphorus loadings from point and non-point sources varied considerably from
watershed to watershed. This study estimated the cost of phosphorus reduction associated with various
policy options and found that the cost of reducing phosphorus from controlling point sources to be
considerably higher than those based on trading between point and non-point sources. The estimates for
point source controls ranged from a low of $10.38 per pound of phosphorus in the Wisconsin watershed
to a high of $23.89 per pound in the Michigan watershed. Using trading between point and non-point
sources, these costs can be lowered to $5.95 per pound in the Wisconsin watershed (a reduction of over
40%) and to $4.04 in the Michigan watershed (a reduction of over 80%). Paul Faeth, Market-Based
Incentives and Water Quality, at 6 (World Resources Institute 1999), available at
http://www.wri.org/wrilincentives/pdfgfaeth.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
23. EPA Draft Framework, supra note 19, at 8-1.
24. Id. at 5-1.
25. Id. at 6-1. One example of a successful pretreatment effluent trading scheme is the Passaic
Valley Sewerage Commission Effluent Trading Project. See Sharing the Load: Effluent Trading for
Indirect Dischargers (Final Report from New Jersey Chemical Industry Project Effluent Trading Team,
1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppe/isd/nj/trading/sharing.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
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III. THE HISTORY OF POLLUTION TRADING
While the economic basis for pollution trading has been evident ever since the
publication of groundbreaking economic studies in the late sixties, the transition
from theory to practice has been slow and uneven. Although emissions trading
programs for a variety of air pollutants have proved very successful in the United
States over the past thirty years, effluent trading programs only got under way in the
eighties, and have only been established in large numbers over the past few years.
Other countries have also been very slow to adopt pollution trading, although over
the past few years trading has started to expand beyond America's borders at a more
rapid rate.
A. AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS TRADING
The United States has implemented a number of different pollutant trading
programs, with varying degrees of success. 6 The first offset trading program was
established in the mid-seventies as a mechanism to allow economic development in
areas that failed to meet ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.27
There have since been major American emissions trading programs dealing with SO2
and NOx emissions, CFC production, lead in gasoline, oxygenates in gasoline, NOx
tailpipe emissions, the sulfur content of gasoline, particulate matter and NOx
emissions from heavy-duty truck engines, corporate average fuel economy (CAFE),
hazardous air pollutants, and hazardous organic chemicals.28 A number of states
have also established emissions trading programs, mainly dealing with VOC 29 and
NOx emissions." This section will briefly describe how emissions trading has been
most commonly used in the Clean Air Act, along with three of the more specific
examples of nationwide emissions trading in the United States.
The EPA has allowed a number of broad emissions trading options in
connection with its implementation of the Clean Air Act." These programs can be
broken down into bubbles, offsets, netting and banking.32
Bubbles provide a way for a firm to increase emissions at one or more emission
sources in exchange for larger decreases at other reasonably interconnected emission
26. See generally, EPA, The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting the
Environment (1997), available at http://199.223.18.220/EE%5Cepa%5Ceed.nsf/pages/incentives (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003).
27. Id. at 71.
28. Id.
29. Organic compounds whose vapor pressure at 200 C exceeds 0. 13 kPa are referred to as Volatile
Organic Compounds (VOC). VOC have been implicated as a major precursor in case of production of
photochemical smog, which causes atmospheric haze, eye irritation and respiratory problems. VOC
emissions are typical for oil processing, petrochemical and chemical plants.
30. Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Washington have all
implemented trading programs. In addition, the Los Angeles area has developed a significant SO2 and
NOx emissions trading initiative known as "RECLAIM." The United States Experience with Economic
Incentives for Protecting the Environment, supra note 26.
31. See EPA, The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting the
Environment (January 2001), available at
http://199.223.18.220/EE%5Cepa%5Ceed.nsf/tpages/incentives, at 72-74 (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
32. See Robert Hahn & Gordon Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 118 (1989).
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sources in the same facility so that the total emissions from the facility do not exceed
the sum of all the sources' individual emission limits. The EPA has approved
bubbles for firms emitting particulate matter, sulfur dioxides, and volatile organic
compounds.33
Offsets are a form of emissions trading that can be used when a major new
emission source seeks to locate in a non-attainment area. The proposed new
emissions may be offset with emission reductions of an equal or greater amount.
Offsets can involve either internal or external trades, although studies have shown
that external trades take place relatively infrequently.34
Netting allows a firm seeking to increase emissions at one source in a plant to
avoid classification as a major source by reducing emissions elsewhere within its
facility. Netting has been allowed in varying forms since 1974 and has been the
most widely used form of emissions trading activity under the Clean Air Act.35
Banking enables a firm to hold emissions reduction credits as assets for future
use or sale. It has been the least commonly utilized for of emissions trading under
the Clean Air Act because it was made dependent on state or local agencies
establishing regulatory programs, which few did due to restrictions on the use of
banked credits and uncertainty in the nature of the property right being banked.36
One example of a truly innovative early emissions trading program was the
EPA's Lead Phasedown Program, which was operational from 1979 until 1987.
Unlike most emissions trading programs, the Lead Phasedown Program was targeted
at the production of a substance (gasoline), rather than the release of that substance
into the environment. The EPA initially set quarterly limits on the average lead
content of all gasoline sold in the country. If a refiner wanted to exceed the limit on
lead content for any quarter, it had to acquire lead rights from a refiner that was
producing gasoline with less than the mandated average lead levels. 7 The Lead
Program achieved a high level of participation and has been considered a major
success by both economists and environmentalists.38
A later (and most important) national emissions trading program was the S02
allowance trading provisions of the Acid Rain Program instituted under Title IV of
the Clean Air Amendments of 1990. This is a closed program, with a cap of 8.95
million tons of S02 per year.39 The Acid Rain program is ongoing and is generally
considered to be quite successful. The number of SO 2 emissions allowances traded
exceeded one million per year between 1992 and mid-1997.40 The transaction costs
of SO2 allowance trading has remained relatively low due to the use of electronic
33. Id. at 123.
34. Id. at 119-20.
35. Id. at 132-33.
36. Id. at 130-3 1.
37. Robert W. Hahn & Gordon Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice 16
ECOLOGY L. Q. 361, 382 (1989).
38. See Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient
Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3(2) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 95 (1989);
39. Faeth, supra note 9, at 14.
40. Barry D. Solomon, Five Years of Interstate S02 Allowance Trading: Geographic Patterns and
Potential Cost Savings, 11(4) THE ELECTRICITY JOURNAL, 58 (1998).
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bulletin boards, experienced brokers, and the anonymity of market participants.4
Finally, in response to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete
the Ozone Layer, the EPA developed a program in 1990 for the trading of
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) and halon production rights. As was the case with the
Lead Phasedown Program, limits were placed on the production of these chemicals
by industry, and not on their eventual release into the environment. Despite the
requirement of pre-approval for all trades, the trading program was administered by
just four EPA staff persons.42 The program was eliminated in 1996 because the main
CFCs had been virtually eliminated from the U.S. domestic market.
Over the past few years, many other countries around the world have started to
show interest in emissions trading of one form or another. 3 Much of this interest has
been sparked by the controversial negotiations surrounding emissions trading in the
Kyoto climate change regime, which calls for the international trading of greenhouse
gas emission rights." This has prompted work on the development of a greenhouse
gas emissions trading scheme within the European Union,45 and some countries are
also developing domestic greenhouse gas trading programs.46 Additional programs
that are in the works include a SO2 trading scheme in Slovakia and NOx trading
schemes in New South Wales,47 the United Kingdom, 8 and the Netherlands.49
41. Barry D. Solomon, New Directions in Emissions Trading: The Potential Contribution of New
Institutional Economics, 30(3) ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 371 (1999).
42. David Lee, Trading Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (Elizabeth
Cook, ed., World Res. Inst. 1996).
43. According to one analyst, other developed countries have been slow to embrace emissions
trading primarily because of bureaucratic inertia and satisfaction with their current systems of
environmental regulation, and secondarily because of a cultural bias against mixing markets and the
environment, which is intensified by the perception that 'emissions trading is an American idea'. Frank
Convery, Emissions Trading and Environmental Policy in Europe, Paper presented in Goteborg,
Sweden, June 2001, at
http://www.ucd.ie/-envinst/envstud/CATEP%20Webpage/publications/oteborg.pdf, at 11 (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003). European countries have been more active in utilizing pollution taxation. France,
Germany, and the Netherlands all have effluent charge systems in place, whereby factories are taxed
according to the amount of pollutants they discharge into waterways. However, the level of taxation in
these systems are generally set at too low a level to significantly influence discharge practices, and are
instead used largely as revenue generation schemes. See "Economic Instruments for Water Pollution",
Report for U.K. Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, available at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/water/quality/economistl/eiwp09.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003);
Thomas Lundmark, Systemizing Environmental Law on a German Model, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y. 1, 40 (1998); Matthieu Glachant, The Political Economy of Water Effluent Charges in France:
Why Are Rates Kept Low?, 14(1) EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002).
44. See Malik Amin Aslam, et. al. Greenhouse Gas Market Perspectives: Trade and Investment
Implications of the Climate Change Regime. UNCTAD/DITC/TED/Misc.9 (Geneva: United Nations,
July 2001). http://r.unctad.org/ghg/publications/ghgnktpersp.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
45. See Peter Zapfel and Matti Vainio, Pathways to European Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading:
History and Misconceptions, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota Di Lavoro 85.2002 (October 2002).
46. Domestic greenhouse gas emission trading programs are operational in the United Kingdom and
Denmark and are expected to become operational soon in Norway and Sweden. Many other countries
are in the process of considering proposals. OECD, Implementing Domestic Tradeable Permits: Recent
Developments and Future Challenges (2001) at 74.
47. New South Wales Treasury Department, Experts Group Background Paper No. 1, available at
http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/salinity/bgpaperl .htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
48. Convery, supra note 43, at 10.
49. Id.
20031
GREAT PLAINS NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
B. EFFLUENT TRADING
The development of effluent trading schemes is a fairly recent phenomenon.
The first American effluent trading schemes arose in the nineteen-eighties, with the
Fox River Program in 1981, the Lake Dillon Program in 1982 and the Tar-Pamlico
River Basin Program in 1986. These three programs will be discussed in further
detail in the following section.
Although a handful of new effluent trading programs arose in the early to mid
nineties, it has only been in the past five years that such programs have begun to
proliferate. In large part the slow development of effluent trading programs is
probably due to uncertainty over whether trading would be considered legal by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the terms of the Clean
Water Act." More recently, trading programs have blossomed under an increased
(and explicit) regulatory flexibility on the part of the EPA, as laid out in the 1996
Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy5' and 2002 Proposed Water Quality Trading
Policy. 2 Today there are approximately 37 effluent trading programs in operation in
the United States. A table listing these programs is provided in Appendix 1.
In recent years there has also been increased interest in effluent trading
programs outside of the United States. Australia has implemented effluent trading
schemes in both the Hunter River Basin and the Murray-Darling Watershed.53 In
addition, there have been proposals for effluent trading schemes in other parts of the
world, including Scotland,54 China,55 and Sweden. 6
IV. CASE STUDIES OF EFFLUENT TRADING SCHEMES
This section will examine six of the effluent trading schemes that have been
adopted in the United States and Australia.
A. THE UNITED STATES
The following case studies will summarize four of the effluent trading schemes
in the United States with fairly long histories: the Fox River Trading Program, the
Lake Dillon Trading Program, the Tar-Pamlico Trading Program, and the Grasslands
50. See Statement of Benjamin Grumbles, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Water, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, before the House Subcommittee on Water Resources and
Environment of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (June 13, 2002), available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/06-13-02/grumbles.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
51. See EPA, Effluent Trading in Watersheds: Policy Statement, available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/tradetbl.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
52. See EPA, 2002 Proposed Water Quality Trading Policy, available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingpolicy.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
53. These schemes will be analyzed in the next chapter.
54. See Nick Hanley, Robin Faichney, Alastair Munro & James Shortle, Economic and
Environmental Modelling for Pollution Control in an Estuary, 52 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, 211-225 (1998).
55. See Wendong Tao, Bo Zhou, William Barron & Weimin Yang, Tradable Discharge Permit
System for Water Pollution: Case of the Upper Nanpan River of China, 15 ENVIRONMENTAL AND
RESOURCE ECONOMICS, 27-38 (2000).
56. See Runar Brannlund, Yangho Chung, et al., Emissions Trading and Profitability: The Swedish
Pulp and Paper Industry 12(3) ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS 345-356 (1998).
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Area Trading Program. These programs have been chosen because they are
examples of the different types of possible effluent trading schemes. The Fox River
program, which was recently dismantled, involved simple point-point trading. The
Lake Dillon program and Tar-Pamlico program exhibit two different approaches to
point-non-point trading, with the Tar-Pamlico program also allowing point-point
trading. Finally, the Grasslands Area program only allows trading between different
non-point sources.
1. Fox River Trading Program
The Fox River program was begun in 1981, making it the first effluent trading
program in the United States. It was dismantled in the year 2000, although a new
pilot trading program is being developed currently to take its place." It allowed
trading between point sources of permits to discharge wastes that increase
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) within a 6,400 square mile drainage area in
northeast Wisconsin." The participants included "fifteen industrial facilities, mostly
paper mills, and six municipal facilities."'5 9
The Fox River program imposed a number of important restrictions on permit
trading. Prior to entering the market, both buyer and seller were required to have put
in place certain pollution-lowering technology requirements. Also, the program was
divided into three river segments, each with approximately an equal number of
participants, with a prohibition on trading between segments.60 Trading was allowed
only if the buyer was a new facility, was increasing production, or was unable to
meet required discharge limits despite optimal operation of its treatment facilities.'
Traded rights had a life of at least one year, but were not to run past the expiration
date of the seller's discharge permit, which was, at most, a five year period.62 Since
effluent discharge limits changed with each permit renewal, there was no guarantee
that rights that were traded-in during one permit period would be available during
subsequent permit periods.63
In the long history of the Fox River program, only one trade between
dischargers took place. A number of explanations have been suggested for the
disappointingly low level of trading activity under this scheme. One reason is that
dischargers developed a variety of compliance alternatives not contemplated when
57. James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA 's New TMDL
Rules, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 79 (2000).
58. See Economic Instruments for Water Pollution, Report for U.K. Dept. for Environment, Food &
Rural Affairs, available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/water/quality/econinstl/eiwp09.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
59. Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant
Trading, 23 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 137, 186 (1998).
60. Id. at 187. Narrowing the geographical area within which trades can be conducted is one way to
deal with the "hot spot" problem. On the other hand, it also cuts down on the potential cost savings by
limiting the trading possibilities.
61. See EPA, The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting the
Environment (January 2001), available at
http://199.223.18.220/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B-07.pdf/$File/EE-0216B-07.pdf at 101 (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the regulations were drafted. Secondly, there were questions about the vulnerability
of the program to legal challenge, as the Clean Water Act does not explicitly
authorize effluent trading. Thirdly, the requirement that all facilities meet minimum
technology-based effluent limits prior to trading has been seen as very restrictive, as
have the many other trading restrictions noted in the previous paragraph. 6' Finally,
one analyst has claimed that regulators who did not support the concept of effluent
trading erected bureaucratic barriers that frustrated the process.65 The Fox-Wolf
Basin 2000 organization, a non-profit watershed alliance, is currently studying how a
new and improved Fox River trading program can be implemented.66
2. Lake Dillon Trading Program
The Lake Dillon Trading Program was the second effluent trading program to
be implemented, in 1984, and it has been examined by a number of scholars. 7 Lake
Dillon is a reservoir near Denver that is an important source of water for the Denver
area and also a tourist attraction. Four municipal treatment plants, sixteen small
treatment plants, and many non-point sources discharge waste into the reservoir. 8
The Lake Dillon Program deals with potassium discharges and currently
involves point-non-point trading exclusively.69 Point sources are allowed to obtain
offsets from their load allocations by controlling loads from non-point sources that
existed prior to the program's inception in 1984. The trading ratio for point sources
is 2:1, i.e., for every two units of reduction that a point source obtains through
controlling emissions in a non-point source, it can increase its own emissions by one
unit above its load allocation. The "banking" of credits from non-point reductions
for future use by point sources is not allowed."
There is disagreement among commentators over the degree to which the Lake
Dillon Program can be considered a success. Trading has been infrequent, but this is
probably due to lower than expected growth in the region and improvements in point
source pollution reduction technology rather than any problems inherent to the
64. Id.
65. See Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal? in
TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 73, 97 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, eds. 1993).
66. See Fourth Progress Report on the Trading of Water Pollution Credits, on State of Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources webpage, at
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wmi/nps/pt/PT2002.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
67. See Richard T. Woodward, Lessons about Effluent Trading from a Single Trade, available at
http://ageco.tamu.edu/faculty/woodward/paps/CaseStudy.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003); Case Studies
on the Trading of Effluent Loads: Dillon Reservoir Final Report, Cambridge, MA, Industrial Economics
(1984).
68. See Andreas Kraemer, Eduard Interwies & Eleftheria Kampa, Tradeable Permits in Water
Resource Protection and Management: A Review of Experience and Lessons Learned, in OECD,
IMPLEMENTING DOMESTIC TRADEABLE PERMITS, 227, 246 (2002). The primary source of non-point
pollution is runoff from towns and ski areas, along with seepage from failing septic systems. Powers,
supra note 59 at 191-92.
69. Mahesh Podar, A Summary of U.S. Effluent Trading and Offset Projects, prepared for U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Nov. 1999), p. 8, available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). However, there
has been some pressure to also allow trading between point sources. Id. Trading between different non-
point sources has also been considered in at least three instances. Susan Austin, Designing a Nonpoint
Source Selenium Load Trading Program, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 337, at n. 37 (2001).
70. Woodward, supra note 67, at 5.
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trading program (although if banking was allowed, that would perhaps have
prompted more trades). According to one commentator: "Despite the restrictions
that are present in the Lake Dillon trading program and despite its long period of
inactivity, a major trade has finally taken place that led to environmental gains while
making the participants better off. While it seems unlikely that future trades will be
numerous and frequent, the trade shows that when the need arises, the trading option
adds valuable flexibility for the control of water quality in the Lake Dillon area."'"
3. Tar-Pamlico
The Tar-Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Reduction Trading Program is an
effluent trading program involving aspects of point-point trading and point-non-
point trading within the 5,440-square mile Tar-Pamlico watershed in North
Carolina.72 The program was initiated in 1991 to deal with an excess of nutrients
(primarily nitrogen and phosphorus) which had resulted in extensive algal blooms
and fish kills. 3
The Tar-Pamlico Program revolves around an association of twelve point
source dischargers within the watershed. An effluent cap is set annually for the
Association to meet collectively. Within the Association, informal point-point
trading regularly occurs so that the Association as a whole can meet its cap. If they
fail to meet the cap (which so far has never happened), the dischargers have to pay
an offset fee for each unit of pollutant by which they, as a group, have exceeded the
cap. These offset funds would then go to a voluntary agricultural cost share program,
and would be used to pay participating farmers 75% of the cost of installing nutrient-
reducing Best Management Practices (BMPs) on their farms. This can be seen as a
variety of point-non-point trading.74 Trading ratios for non-point source programs
are set at 3:1 for cropland best management practices and 2:1 for confined animal
operations.75 This ratio is meant to account for the fact that non-point source
loadings are less predictable over time and space and are less reliably controlled than
point source controls. All non-point credits have a useful life of ten years unless cost
share program contracts with the non-point sources provide for a longer period."
Thus, the Tar-Pamlico program to some extent establishes responsibility at the
group level, while allowing for trades between group members. Non-point
agricultural sources participate voluntarily through the cost share program. Overall,
the Tar-Pamlico program might be described more accurately as an exceedence tax
on point sources, the proceeds of which are applied to a more cost-effective method
71. Id. at 13.
72. See North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural Resources website, at
http://www.enr.state.nc.us/nps/tarpam.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
73. Id.
74. See North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural Resources, Frequently Asked
Questions about the Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program, at http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/FAQs9-
Olprn.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
75. See Elaine Mullaly Jacobson, Leon E. Danielson, and Dana L. Hoag, Report on the Tar-Pamlico
River Basin Nutrient Trading Program, available at
http://www.bae.ncsu.edu/programs/extension/publicat/arep/tarpam.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
76. Id.
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of achieving the reductions (i.e., through non-point sources).
Despite the lack of point-non-point trading (due to the fact that the nutrient
reduction goals for the Association have always been achieved), the Tar-Pamlico
program is generally considered to be successful. Nutrient reductions under the first
phase of the program were greater than that set as the goal," and cost savings (from
the informal point-point exchanges) were considerable, according to one study."
However, the program has faced some resistance from farmers who are worried that
voluntary regulation under a non-point source trading program would lead to
mandatory regulation of non-point sources."
4. Grassland Area Tradable Loads Program
The Grassland Area program involves seven irrigation and drainage districts in
the area of California's San Luis Drain that came together to form a group called the
Grassland Area Farmers. The purpose of this group was to cost-effectively decrease
the aggregate level of selenium released into the San Luis Drain, as had been
required by an agreement on the use of the Drain, which is owned by the United
States Bureau of Reclamation." The trading program was initiated in 1998."
The initial limit on the aggregate amount of selenium that the Grassland Area
Farmers are allowed to discharge is set each year by the state regulatory authority. 2
The Grassland Area Farmers then administer an internal selenium load trading
program. Pursuant to the rules of the trading program, the total allowable selenium
load is allocated among the member districts. At the end of each year, individual
districts pay a fee or receive a rebate if they discharge more or less than the amount
allotted to them.8 3 The districts can either meet their load allocation or buy selenium
load allocation from other districts. Regulatory oversight is important to ensure that
the aggregate regional load targets are met. However, trades take place among
member districts without regulatory oversight; the Grassland Area Farmers take it
upon themselves to monitor discharge from each district.
The Grassland Area program has been quite successful. Selenium discharges
were reduced by a third during the first two years of the program. Nine trades were
made during the first two years, and transaction costs were kept a minimum through
monthly meetings of the districts where information could be exchanged.'
The program is considered innovative for a few reasons. Firstly, unlike most
77. See Andreas Kraemer, et al., supra note 68, at 245.
78. See Great Lakes Trading Network: Projects and Programs, at
www.gltn.org/programs/programs.htm (2001).
79. See Anne Coan, Natural Resources Director, North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation,
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Regarding Trading Water Pollution Reduction Credits,
available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/06-13-02/coan.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
80. See Austin, supra note 69, at 349.
81. See Susan Austin, Overview of Tradeable Loads Program in the Grassland Drainage Area,
available at http://www.gltn.org/resources/2000conf/grassland2.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
82. Austin, supra note 69 at 337-38.
83. Podar, supra note 69, at 1.
84. Terry Young & Joe Karkoski, Green Evolution: Are Economic Incentives the Next Step in Non-
Point Source Pollution Control?, 2 WATER POLICY 151, at 4.2 (2000); Kraemer et al., supra note 68, at
248.
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other effluent trading schemes, it involves purely non-point agricultural sources.
Secondly, the combination of a trading scheme with collective fees and a rebate
system is unique. Thirdly, the trading system is especially liberal in the possible
trades it allows, with load allocations being traded for other load allocations, money,
or services.
B. AUSTRALIA
1. Hunter River Valley Salinity Trading Scheme
The Hunter River Valley Salinity Trading Scheme was introduced by the New
South Wales Environmental Protection Agency in 19955 It was the first effluent
trading scheme set up outside the United States. The scheme's goal is to manage
discharges of saline water from coal mines and electricity generators to the Hunter
River so that river salinity does not exceed levels that are detrimental to agricultural
productivity or environmental quality downstream. 6  Discharge privileges are
explicitly based on a quantitative environmental goal, rather than technology-based
standards. 7
The scheme operates only during periods of "high" water flow.8 Credit holders
can either use their credits to authorize their own discharges or trade them with other
participating entities. Trades can be permanent or temporary. Through the trading
mechanism, new mines and other industries can be established without
compromising the environmental goal, thus creating a classic "closed" trading
system. The trading scheme operates only during high flows, with unlimited
discharges allowed during flood flows except as needed to protect a particular
tributary. 89 The scheme relies on an extensive salinity monitoring network in the
river and at each authorized point of discharge. "The monitoring gauges
automatically report by radio or phone to the [Department of Land and Water
Conservation's] central data warehouse."9
The Hunter River Valley trading scheme has been seen as very successful at
reducing salinity levels at a low cost. Prior to the introduction of the scheme,
salinity levels were exceeded by 33%, a level which decreased to 4% as of 2001.
There were 31 trades during 2001. While the scheme has been considered a pilot
project until now, the EPA has proposed that a more permanent regulatory
85. Kraemer et al., supra note 68, at 249.
86. See Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme website, at
http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/licensing/hrsts/index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
87. Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme website, developments section, at
http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/licensing/hrsts/developments.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
88. Where water levels are low, no saline discharges are allowed, and when water levels reach the
"flood" level, unlimited discharges are allowed. Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme website, supra
note 86.
89. Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme website, developments section, supra note 87.
90. Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme website, monitoring section, at
http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/licensing/hrsts/monitoring.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
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framework be set up, and legislation is currently pending to implement this plan.9
One innovative aspect of the Hunter River Valley scheme is the use of an on-
line credit exchange, which is operated by the New South Wales EPA.92 Market
participants can post offers to buy or sell discharge credits, and can view the
holdings, trade potential, and trading history of each member.
2. South Creek Bubble Licensing System
In 1996, the New South Wales Environmental Protection Agency introduced a
small, self-contained, effluent trading scheme in the South Creek area of the
Hawkesbury-Nepean River. This area had historically been prone to eutrophication,
and algal blooms were occurring at frequent intervals despite reductions in nutrient
loads. The 'bubble' scheme allowed three sewage treatment systems to adjust their
individual discharges, provided the total pollutant load limit for the system was not
exceeded. "The load limits mandated under the bubble scheme required an 83%
reduction in total phosphorus and a 50% reduction in total nitrogen by 2004 when
compared to a 'business as usual' scenario. 93
The scheme must be considered a success in that significant load reductions
have been recorded for the eight years following the commencement of the bubble.94
These reductions have been achieved not by formalized trading, but rather by
coordinating plant optimization strategies and by upgrading particular treatment
processes to reduce the total nutrient loads discharged in treated effluent.95 The
bubble scheme has allowed considerable cost savings over a uniform effluent
reduction approach for each participating plant. According to one analysis, the
bubble scheme will result in a savings of $45.6 million (Australian) over the period
1996-2008.96
The EPA has discussed expanding the program to include non-point sources as
well, but concluded that this would be unwarranted for the time being, as non-point
sources are not currently a comparable source of pollution as non-point source
stormwater runoff generally occurs only in wet weather, when its impact is lessened
by the increased river flow.97
IV. LESSONS FROM EXISTING EFFLUENT TRADING PROJECTS
It is important to emphasize that issues relating to water pollution vary
91. A draft of the proposed regulations is available on the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme
website, at http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/licensing/hrsts/r99-325-d09.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
92. The Hunter River Valley credit exchange website is located at
http://hrsl.epa.nsw.gov.au/default.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). Some information is only accessible
by members with a password, but much of the site can be viewed by the general public. Id.
93. See New South Wales EPA web page, at http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/licensing/bubble.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2003).
94. See Helen Betts O'Shea & Elizabeth Davidson, Innovative Environmental Regulation in South
Creek: The Performance of the Bubble Licensing Scheme and Future Directions, Report for New South
Wales EPA, at http://www.uws.edu.au/seewrt/research/publications/scrkpapers/betts.pdf (last visited
Feb. 15, 2003).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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immensely from place to place. Therefore, measures to address pollution in
Wisconsin may not be appropriate in North Carolina, let alone in countries with
different cultures and political systems. Trading systems must always be adapted to
local needs and conditions, and innovation should be encouraged. Nevertheless, by
examining the short histories of existing effluent trading projects, one can note
certain issues that the current schemes show to be important, and draw certain
conclusions regarding what can make an effluent trading scheme successful. In this
section, the paper will try to highlight some of these lessons.
A. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
One conclusion that has uniformly been drawn by participants in current
effluent trading schemes as well as academics is the importance of seeking the
advice and cooperation of the affected communities. One of the major objections to
the use of market-based environmental regulation schemes is that they can be more
opaque than standard command-and-control regulation as environmental
organizations, for example, may not know how much a particular facility is actually
polluting, or is allowed to pollute. However, this need not be the case. According to
a representative of the United States EPA: "Public participation in development of
trading programs and ongoing access to information about trades is vital. EPA's
water quality trading policy states that public participation is provided through
federal permit and TMDL requirements and encourages further public participation
in development and implementation of trading programs." 98 The American case
studies show a range of innovative types of involvement in effluent trading schemes
by various governmental entities as well as farmers, industry, and a whole range of
non-governmental organizations.99
B. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
Another important issue to be dealt with is how the regulatory and statutory
structure of trading regimes relates to pre-existing pollution control laws and
institutions. Trading regimes tend to be added into a pre-existing superstructure of
command-and-control regulations, environmental quality objectives, and other
policy instruments. This is probably desirable (and certainly unavoidable) both for
political and economic reasons. The use of a variety of different policy instruments
provides different weapons that can attack the various aspects of the water pollution
problem. Also, the pre-existing regulatory structure has been relatively successful in
most countries, and as a political matter could not easily be discarded even if that
98. See Statement of Benjamin Grumbles, supra note 50.
99. One particular organization of note is the Great Lakes Trading Network, which calls itself "a
national clearinghouse for water quality trading projects" and is made up of stakeholders from both the
public and private sectors. See Great Lakes Trading Network website, at www.envtn.org (last visited
Oct. 23, 2003). Other organizations have sprung up around individual watersheds, such as the Fox-Wolf
Watershed Alliance, which is an "independent, non-profit organization that identifies issues and
advocates effective policies and actions to protect, restore and sustain the water resources of Wisconsin's
Fox-Wolf River Basin" See Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance, at http://www.fwb2k.org/main.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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were warranted economically.
However, the American examples show that for effluent trading to be
successful, it must be explicitly allowed by the environmental laws and regulations.
The many years of lingering uncertainty over whether the Clean Water Act allowed
for effluent trading is one of the reasons why trading systems have developed so
slowly in America, and why entities have been reluctant to make trades where such
systems do exist. This problem has been recognized and addressed in recent years,
as evidenced by the EPA's 2002 Proposed Water Quality Trading Policy and the
move to introduce legislation in Australia to make permanent the Hunter River
Valley Trading Scheme.
C. HOT SPOTS
One caveat that has been stressed by all participants in American effluent
trading programs is that they must be defined so as to prevent the emergence of
localized "hot spots" or accumulations of pollutants that result in adverse effects on
local water quality."°  Unrestricted effluent trading would have the potential to
wreak havoc on areas around particular point sources by allowing these sources to
concentrate emissions or discharges through the purchase of allowances from other
locations. This problem has been dealt with in a few ways by existing programs.
On a large scale, effluent trading schemes have so far been restricted to individual
watersheds. This makes environmental sense as it avoids sacrificing the
environmental health of one watershed to fund pollutant decreases in other
geographically unrelated areas.
On a more local scale, most existing effluent trading programs have provisions
that permit the governing body to annul a trade that would lead to destructive
localized pollution.' For example, Section IV of the Tar-Pamlico Agreement
stipulates that if such a localized water quality impact occurs, the Division of Water
Quality reserves the right to require nutrient removal from a facility to eliminate the
problem. In the future, one would expect to see increasingly sophisticated economic
and environmental modeling systems that would take into account upstream or
downstream location in determining the trading value of a particular permit.0 2
100. See Statement of Benjamin Grumbles, supra note 50; Statement of Rena Steinzor, on behalf of
the Center for Progressive Regulation, before a Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment of
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure in the U.S. House of Representatives (June 13,
2002), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/06-13-02/steinzor.html (last visited Oct.
22, 2003); A New Tool for Water Quality, supra note 2.
101. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing
Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 EcOLOGY L.Q. 569 (2001)
(describing this and other means of dealing with the problem of hot spots).
102. For one interesting study, See Daigee Shaw & Ming-Feng Hung, "A Trading-Ration System for
Trading Water Pollution Discharge Permits", paper presented at 2002 World Congress of Environment
and Resource Economists, available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/-carsonvs/Sapers/100.pdf (last visited Oct.
23, 2003) (proposing a trading ratio system that takes into account water pollution loads transferred from
upstream zones).
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D. TRANSACTION COSTS AND INCENTIVES TO TRADE
If significant levels of trading are to occur, transaction costs must be kept low,
and there must be a sufficient incentive to trade. When there are only a few
participants in the trading scheme, as is the case with the South Creek bubble, for
example, then transaction costs will generally not be very high.1 3 Dischargers will
be able to easily locate other dischargers and inquire about trading opportunities. As
the number of participants grows, it will become more difficult to arrange trades.
The Grassland Area scheme addresses this issue with monthly meetings of the
dischargers. The Hunter River Valley program deals with the problem through the
use of an on-line trading network. Both of these methods seem to have worked well
so far. In the American emissions trading markets, brokerage services have been
used quite extensively. This option could be considered for large effluent markets.
Of course, even if transaction costs are kept reasonably low, there still needs to
be a built-in incentive to trade. For some American programs, most notable the
Dillon Lake scheme and the Tar-Pamlico scheme, the incentive simply did not exist
to any great extent because the targeted discharge levels for the body of water were
being met even absent trading. From an environmental perspective, this could be a
sign of success, rather than failure. However, it is important not to set the initial
permitted discharge levels too high."° Another disincentive to trading in some point-
non-point schemes is the high trading ratios. For example, the trading ratio is 2:1 in
the Lake Dillon scheme, and in the Tar-Pamlico scheme the trading ratio ranges
from 2:1 to 3:1. While trading ratios may make environmental sense given the
uncertainty of non-point reductions, if they reach a level at which trading activity is
discouraged to too great an extent, these ratios may defeat the whole purpose of the
scheme." 5 An alternative to set ratios that has been tried in some effluent trading
schemes is the use of coefficients where effluent reduction is of more value in one
part of the watershed than in another, due to environmental conditions.' °6 While this
strategy may add to the environmental effectiveness of a trading regime, the greater
complexity may also increase the administration and transactions costs.
103. The flip side of small markets is that they reduce the potential financial gains from trading and
create potential market power problems.
104. As one analyst notes:
"[s]tationary and point sources [under command-and-control regimes] often achieve reductions in their
discharges below the levels of their permits. The phenomenon of actual discharges that are substantially
lower than permitted discharges is especially common when a lack of resources to implement a
regulatory program results in large numbers of expired permits incorporating limits based on outmoded
technologies."
This analyst goes on to recommend that effluent trading rules should not allow local or overall levels of
discharges that exceed the actual levels measured prior to the program's implementation. See Statement
of Rena Steinzor, supra note 100.
105. According to one analyst: "Much of the success of a [point-non-point] trading program, as
measured by improvements in water quality, rests with the difficult decision of choosing an appropriate
trading ratio." Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings,
23 ENVTL. L. 43, 66 (1993).
106. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53
STAN. L. REV. 607, 638-39 (2000) (discussing Long Island Sound Nutrient Trading Program. The
article also gives a good general overview of the use of ratios and coefficients in the development of
pollutant trading schemes).
2003]
GREATPLAINS NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
E. MONITORING
The U.S. EPA has stated that "[m]onitoring is essential to evaluate program
performance and make adjustments as needed to meet water quality goals."'' 7
According to one study, monitoring has been inefficient in the pilot effluent trading
programs in the United States.' °
With point sources, direct monitoring is often feasible, as is shown by the
relatively sophisticated automatically reporting salinity gauges in the Hunter River
Valley scheme. However, the issue of monitoring becomes much more difficult
when dealing with non-point sources. According to one analyst, "although progress
has been made - especially in the Netherlands-in estimating the amount of
nutrients that are produced by disparate farming operations, these threshold
methodologies remain far more of an art than a science."'' 9 Evidently, without
proper monitoring procedures, enforcement of a regulatory system will be made
impossible, whether the system is based on trading or a command-and-control
model.
IV. CONCLUSION
The American and Australian effluent trading schemes described in this paper
demonstrate a range of innovative solutions that can be applied to the water pollution
problem. They show that effluent trading can be a cost-effective means of pollution
control. However, the American experience also shows us that effluent trading
schemes do not always succeed in producing the level of savings anticipated by
economists. While they have produced significant cost savings in some cases, such
as the Grasslands Area Tradable Loads Program, other systems such as the Fox
River Trading Program have recorded many fewer trades than expected, leading to
lower than expected savings. While this has been disappointing given the high
expectations of some economists, the relative paucity of trades in some systems
should not be seen as damning of the whole effluent trading enterprise. As one
economist wrote: "[E]ven though the gains of moving to a TPP [tradable pollution
permit] system from command-and-control alternatives may be less than was
envisaged in earlier works, these gains are still likely to be positive. In that
important sense, TPP markets are a 'no loss' option for Governments to choose in
the control of pollution.""0
107. See Statement of Benjamin Grumbles, supra note 50.
108. See Faeth, supra note 9, at 43.
109. See Statement of Rena Steinzor, supra note 100.
110. Hanley, supra note 54, at 224.
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APPENDIX 1
List of Existing Effluent Trading Projects"
Effluent Trading Water Body Location Activity Pollutant
Program Description
Bear Creek trading Bear Creek Colorado, U.S.A. Watershed P
program reservoir trading
program
Blue Plains WWTP Chesapeake Bay Washington, D.C., Single trade N
credit creation U.S.A.
Boulder Creek Boulder Creek Colorado, U.S.A. Watershed NH3, pH,
trading program trading temperature
program
Cargill and Des Moines River Iowa, U.S.A. NPDES BOD, NH3
Ajinomoto plants permit
permit flexibility flexibility
Chatfield Reservoir Chatfield Colorado, U.S.A. Watershed P
trading program Reservoir trading
program
Cherry Creek Cherry Creek Colorado, U.S.A. Watershed P
Basin trading Reservoir trading
program program
Chesapeake Bay Chesapeake Bay Multiple States, Watershed N,P
nutrient trading U.S.A. trading
program program
Fox-Wolf Basin Green Bay Wisconsin, U.S.A. Watershed BOD, P
watershed pilot pilot program
trading program
Grasslands Area San Joaquin California, U.S.A. Watershed Se
tradable loads River trading
program program
Hawkesbury- Hawkesbury- New South Wales, Bubble P, N
Nepean River Nepean River Australia license
nutrient trading regime for
sewage
treatment
plants
Hunter River Hunter River New South Wales, Trading Salt
Salinity trading Australia program for
program coal mines
and Pacific
Power
Illinois Illinois waters Illinois, U.S.A. Pretreatment multiple
pretreatment program
trading program
Kalamazoo River Kalamazoo River, Michigan, U.S.A Watershed P
water quality Lake Allegan pilot program
trading
demonstration
111. EPA, The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting the Environment,
supra note 26, at 104-05; as supplemented by figures from Rousseau, supra note 10, at 10-12; Denis
O'Grady and Mary Ann Wilson, Phosphorus Trading in the South Nation River Watershed,
Environmental Trading Network, at www.envtn.org/programs/ontario.PDF (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
2003]
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Lake Dillon trading Dillon reservoir Colorado, U.S.A. Watershed P
program trading
program
Long Island Sound Long Island Connecticut, U.S.A. Watershed N
trading program Sound trading
program
Lower Boise River Boise River Idaho, U.S.A. Watershed P
effluent trading trading
demonstration program
project
Maryland nutrient Maryland waters Maryland, U.S.A. Statewide N, P
trading policy trading
program
Michigan water Michigan waters Michigan, U.S.A. Statewide N, P
quality trading rule trading
development program
Murray-Darling Murray-Darling New South Wales, State Salt
Basin salinity and Australia government
drainage strategy trading
Neuse River Neuse River North Carolina, Watershed N
nutrient sensitive estuary U.S.A. trading
water management program
strategy
New York City Hudson River New York, U.S.A. Offset pilot P
watershed programs
phosphorus offset
pilot programs
Passaic Valley Hudson River New Jersey, U.S.A. Pre-treatment metals
sewerage program
commission
effluent trading
program
Rahr malting Minnesota River Minnesota, U.S.A. Offset for one P, BOD
permit discharger
Red Cedar River Tainter Lake Wisconsin, U.S.A. Watershed P
pilot trading pilot program
program
Rock River Basin Rock River Basin Wisconsin, U.S.A. Watershed P
pilot trading pilot program
program
Saginaw River Saginaw River Michigan, U.S.A. Watershed P
watershed trading watershed program
San Francisco Bay San Francisco California, U.S.A. Regional Hg
mercury offset Bay offset
program program
South Nation River South Nation Ontario, Canada Watershed P
Watershed Trading River trading
Program program
Tar-Pamlico Pamlico River North Carolina, Watershed P, N
nutrient reduction estuary U.S.A. trading
trading program program
Virginia water Virginia waters Virginia, U.S.A. Statewide N
quality trading
improvement act program
and tributary
strategy
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Wisconsin effluent Wisconsin waters Wisconsin, U.S.A. Statewide P
trading rule trading
development program _ __
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ENVTL. L. REV. 337 (2001) (analyzing Grassland Drainage Area selenium load trading
program).
Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost
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